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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case 1
Following a traffic stop and a search of her car, police found methamphetamine and a
glass pipe in Carmen Martinez's car. She was charged with felony possession of a controlled
substance

(methamphetamine),

misdemeanor

possession

of drug

paraphernalia,

and

misdemeanor reckless driving. The day before trial, the State gave notice of its intent to offer
bad-act evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ), including officers' body camera videos
depicting Ms. Martinez in a seemingly-intoxicated state. The next day, the defense objected to
the State's late notice under Rule 404(b). However, the district court ruled the body camera
evidence was admissible, reasoning that Rule 404(b)' s notice requirement) did not apply because
evidence of Ms. Martinez's seemingly-intoxicated state did not fall within the scope of Rule
404(b ). Ultimately, the body camera evidence was admitted, and Ms. Martinez was found guilty
of all counts.
On appeal, Ms. Martinez contends the district court erred in admitting the body camera
footage, as evidence of her appearing drunk or high during the traffic stop was bad-act evidence
within the meaning of Rule 404(b ), and the State failed to give timely notice under that Rule.
(See generally App. Br.)

In response, the State offers a wide array of arguments. First, it attempts to interpose two
procedural barriers to consideration of Ms. Martinez's appellate argument; it argues that
Ms. Martinez's argument either was not preserved (Resp. Br., pp.11, 12-13) or was affirmatively
waived (Resp. Br., pp.11, 13-18).

Second, the State disputes the merits of Ms. Martinez's

argument, arguing the district court was correct to have ruled that evidence suggesting

1

Although this is a consolidated appeal, Ms. Martinez's claim of error relates solely to Case
No. 46894. Ms. Martinez is not asserting any claims of error associated with Case No. 46995.
1

Ms. Martinez was under the influence of drugs or alcohol is not bad-act evidence within the
meaning of Rule 404(b). (Resp. Br., pp.11, 18-21.) Finally, the State argues that any error by
the district court was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.11, 22-25.)
This reply brief is necessary to point out flaws in the State's first two arguments. As to
the State's harmless-error argument, Ms. Martinez simply asks this Court to find that the State
failed to meet its burden of proof

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Martinez's Appellant's Brief detailed the factual and procedural histories of this
case, so Ms. Martinez does not repeat them here.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err in admitting bad-act evidence against Ms. Martinez, where the State
failed to comply with the notice requirement ofldaho Rule of Evidence 404(b )?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Admitting Bad-Act Evidence Against Ms. Martinez, As The State
Failed To Comply With The Notice Requirement Ofldaho Rule Of Evidence 404(b)

A.

The State's Proposed Procedural Bars Have No Application In This Case
The State attempts to interpose two procedural barriers to consideration of the merits of

Ms. Martinez's claim. Initially, the State contends that the issue presented on appeal was not
preserved in the district court. (Resp. Br., pp.11, 12-13.) Next, the State argues that, assuming
the issue presented on appeal was preserved, it was nonetheless retroactively waived when
Ms. Martinez failed to renew her objection to the Rule 404(b) evidence at trial, despite the
district court having already ruled on its admissibility. (Resp. Br., pp.11, 13-18.) The Court
should reject the State's procedural-bar arguments, as they are supported by neither the record,
nor Idaho precedent.

1.

The Issue Presented On Appeal Was Preserved In The District Court

The State's first procedural-bar argument is that Ms. Martinez failed to adequately
preserve the issue presented on appeal. (Resp. Br., pp.11, 12-13.) The State concedes that it
filed a Rule 404(b) notice below, and defense counsel objected to that notice on the basis of
timeliness; however, it argues that because defense counsel never specifically argued that the
evidence that was the subject of the State's own Rule 404(b) notice was, in fact, subject to Rule
404(b ), Ms. Martinez is now precluded from arguing that the bad-act evidence in the State's Rule
404(b) notice fell within the scope of that Rule. (See id.) The State's argument is without merit
for two reasons.
First, the State fundamentally misunderstands Idaho's preservation standards. In State v.
Gonzalez, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear that in order to preserve an issue for appeal,
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"both the issue and the party's position on the issue must be raised before the trial court .... "
165 Idaho 95, 99 (2018). Importantly, when the Gonzalez Court spoke of "the issue," it was
referring to "substantive issues," not "specific legal arguments" in support of those issues. Id. at
98 (discussing Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138 (2017)). The Court
recognized that, given the nature of the appellate process, i.e., appellate counsel's opportunity to
"ruminate on issues" and the potential application of new authorities, legal arguments may
"evolve." 2 Id.
In this case, neither the issue, nor Ms. Martinez's position on that issue, has changed.
The issue is, and has always been, whether the State's Rule 404(b) notice was timely. ( Compare
Tr., p.34, L.2 ("Your Honor, this is untimely notice."), and Tr., p.38, Ls.3-5 (seeking to clarify
the district court's ruling, by asking, "so is this notice then actually being considered timely?
That's my concern"), with App. Br., p.8 ("Did the district court err in admitting bad-act evidence
against Ms. Martinez, where the State failed to comply with the notice requirement ofldaho Rule
of Evidence 404(b)?").) Likewise, Ms. Martinez's position on that issue remains unchanged.
(Compare Tr., p.27, Ls.20-21 ("I'm flat out objecting to this 404(b) as just untimely."), with
2

This case presents a perfect example of why appellate arguments are permitted to be more
evolved than those presented "on the fly" at trial. Below, in objecting to the State's late notice
under Rule 404(b), defense counsel explained to the district court that, because of the lateness of
the notice, he had not had an adequate opportunity to consider it:
I don't even know the merits of his-or of his notice because it came so late
agam....
I'm not familiar enough with his notice at this point because of the late disclosure
to know if something in there is objectionable. I think it just needs to be outright
denied ....
This is untimely. I have frankly not had time-I probably read this in about a
two-minute period because I was in the midst of my own trial preparations getting
this all of a sudden.
I don't really know what he put in there.
(Tr., p.33, L.20-p.35, L.5.)
5

App. Br., p.9 ("The district court erred in admitting bad-act evidence against Ms. Martinez, as
the State failed to comply with the notice requirement ofldaho Rule ofEvidence 404(b).").)
Ultimately, the district court decided this issue in favor of the State based on a specific
legal rationale-that the evidence in question was "not really 404(b) evidence .... It's allowed
outside the requirement of 404(b )." (Tr., p.38, Ls.6-9.) However, this specific legal basis was
part of a larger issue that was squarely presented to, and decided by, the district court, and on
which Ms. Martinez's position has remained wholly consistent.
Further, the State's attempt to re-cast the district court's reason for ruling in the State's
favor as a wholly separate and distinct legal issue is based on a mischaracterization of the record.
Throughout its brief, the State attempts to paint a picture of defense counsel being "explicitly
neutral regarding whether there was any 404(b) evidence disclosed" in the State's Rule 404(b)

notice, and imploring the district court to address that question at trial.

(Resp. Br., p.12

(emphasis added); see, e.g., Resp. Br., p.6 ("Martinez' counsel took no position on whether there
was any 404(b) evidence at issue . . . ."), p.11 ("Her counsel never argued as much below and
explicitly asked the district court to address the issue at trial"), p.12 ("Martinez never argued
below that any of the body-cam videos ... contained any evidence of 'a crime, wrong, or other
act' under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) [and] told the district court that she had no position on
the issue and would make any 404(b) objections at trial .... "), pp.12-13 ("Martinez' counsel
was explicitly neutral regarding whether there was any 404(b) evidence disclosed in the
notice .... "), p.17 ("Martinez ... explicitly disclaimed any such argument pre-trial. Instead she
told the district court that she would make any objections based on Rule 404(b) at trial.").)
However, defense counsel was not "explicitly neutral" about the question of whether the State's
evidence actually fell within the scope of Rule 404(b ). While he admitted that he had not yet had
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sufficient time to fully consider the State's Rule 404(b) notice due to its late filing (see Tr., p.33,
L.20 - p.35, L.5), he also objected to its untimeliness under Rule 404(b) (see Tr., p.27, L.20 p.28, L.7, p.33, L.20 - p.35, L.5, p.38, Ls.3-5), thereby suggesting that he recognized (or at least
assumed for the sake of his argument) that the evidence in question did fall within the scope of
Rule 404(b). Further, to the extent that defense counsel talked about potentially taking up Rule
404(b) admissibility issues at trial, there is no reason to believe that he was referring to the
question of whether certain evidence fell within the scope of the Rule at all, as opposed to
whether that evidence was admissible for a non-propensity purpose under the Rule.

(See

Tr., p.33, L.20 - p.35, L.5.)
Second, and perhaps much more obviously, the State's preservation argument fails
because it does not account for those authorities which hold that an issue is properly presented on
appeal where it was argued to, or decided by the district court. See, e.g., State v. Jeske, 164
Idaho 862, 868 (2019) ("[E]ven though Jeske's counsel did not explicitly mention the blood
draw at one point in time, the judge specifically identified the blood draw in her ruling ....
Consequently, the issue regarding Jeske's refusal to submit to the blood draw was ruled on,
preserved, and will be addressed in this appeal."); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998)
("Since this issue was directly addressed by the trial court below, we will decide this issue on
appeal.").
Here, the question of whether the evidence cited in the State's Rule 404(b) notice fell
within the scope of that Rule was raised (although not argued) by the State. 3 (See Aug., p.2;

3

The State did not affirmatively argue that the evidence discussed in its Rule 404(b) notice did
not fall within the scope of that Rule. Instead, the State simply noted that it did not concede that
the evidence fell within the scope of the Rule. (See Aug., p.2; Tr., p.29, Ls.16-20.)
7

Tr., p.29, Ls.16-20.) It then formed the basis of the district court's ruling on the defense's
timeliness objection:
MR. BYBEE [Defense Counsel]: I just wanted to-so is this notice then
actually being considered timely? That's my concern.
THE COURT: Well, what he wants admitted is not really 404(b) evidence.
That's the Court's decision. It's allowed outside of the requirement of 404(b).
(Tr., p.38, Ls.3-9.)
Whether the issue raised in this case is evaluated under the general preservation standard
recently clarified in Gonzalez, or under the exception to the usual preservation rules discussed
and applied in Jeske and Du Valt, the issue is properly presented on appeal.

2.

The Issue Presented On Appeal Was Not Waived By Ms. Martinez's Failure To
Raise Repeated Objections

The State's second procedural-bar argument is that, even if the issue presented on appeal
was initially preserved, it was subsequently, and retroactively, waived by Ms. Martinez.
(Resp. Br., pp.11, 13-18.) Specifically, the State argues that, even though the district ruled prior
to trial that the evidence fell outside the scope of Rule 404(b) and was admissible, when that
evidence was offered by the State at trial, and the district court asked if defense counsel had an
objection, defense counsel was obligated to object again, and his failure to do so constituted a
retroactive waiver of the issue previously decided and preserved. (Id.)
The State acknowledges that generally, when a trial court unqualifiedly rules on an
evidentiary issue prior to trial, a party need not re-raise the issue during trial in order to preserve
that issue for appeal. (Resp. Br., p.14.) However, it argues that general rule does not apply here,
because when Exhibits 1 and 2 were offered at trial, defense counsel did not stand mute; he said,
"no objection." (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) The State's argument is untenable.

8

The State offers scant Idaho authority for its contention that standing mute preserves a
previously-preserved objection, whereas stating "no objection" retroactively waives the
previously-preserved objection. The State cites only State v. Thompson, 121 Idaho 638 (Ct. App.
1992), in support of this proposition.

(Resp. Br., p.14.)

However, Thompson's vitality is

dubious, given that it has never been cited for this proposition and, more importantly, flies in the
face of long-established Idaho Supreme Court precedent holding that when an evidentiary ruling
is made prior to trial, a party need not lodge her objection again at trial in order to preserve the
issue for appellate review. See, e.g., State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 67 (2011) ("[A] party need
not make a renewed objection to the admission of evidence it has unsuccessfully attempted to
exclude through a motion in limine in order to preserve that objection for appeal."); Kirk v. Ford
Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 702 (2005) ("If . . . the trial court unqualifiedly rules on the

admissibility of evidence prior to trial no further objection is required to preserve the issue for
appeal."); State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 700 (1988) ("[I]fthe motion in limine is made, and the
trial court unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence prior to trial,
no further objection at trial is required in order to preserve the issue for appeal."); Davidson v.
Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563-65 (Ct. App. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 114 Idaho 107

(1987).
Davidson appears to have been the genesis of the general rule that, once there has been an

unqualified pretrial ruling on an evidentiary issue, one need not further object at trial to preserve
the objection for appeal.

See 112 Idaho at 563 ("Although our Supreme Court has not

confronted this precise question, we think it would eschew the necessity of a renewed
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objection."). 4

In Davidson, the Court of Appeals noted that, although "a relatively recent

phenomenon" at that time, motions in limine have gained widespread acceptance and serve a
number of important purposes. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the notion that rulings on
motions in limine are somehow less important than rulings made during trial, and it likewise
rejected those out-of-state authorities which held that objections had to be renewed at trial in
order to preserve issues for appeal. Id. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reasoned that no good
purpose is served by requiring a party to renew an objection at trial in order to preserve an
evidentiary matter for appeal, because: a double-objection requirement would create a waiver
"trap for the unwary or unskilled"; it would cut against the policy underlying Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 46, which provides that objections need not be formal; it would highlight the
arguably-inadmissible evidence for the jury; and it would undermine counsel's ability to make
strategic decisions in advance of trial. Id. at 563-64. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that
"where a judge has denied a motion in limine, failure to renew the objection at trial will not
ordinarily constitute a waiver of the issue on appeal." Id. at 564.
Granted, the Davidson Court did go on to hold that, "The motion will serve as a
continuing objection unless counsel plainly abandons the objection by his subsequent words or
conduct, or unless the evidence is offered at trial for a purpose that the motion did not seek to

foreclose." Id. (emphasis added). However, the plain abandonment that the Court of Appeals
was talking about in that case was an express stipulation for admission of some of the evidence
in question. Id. Merely stating "no objection," when counsel is asked by the trial court, in front
4

Although the Idaho Supreme Court granted review in Davidson, and ultimately vacated a
portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion, it expressly permitted the Court of Appeals' opinion to
stand on the question of whether objections need to be renewed at trial. Davidson v. Beco Corp.,
114 Idaho 107, 107-08 (1987). Since then, the Supreme Court has cited the Court of Appeals'
Davidson opinion for this proposition multiple times. See, e.g., Ellington, 151 Idaho at 67; Kirk,
141 Idaho at 702; Hester, 114 Idaho at 700.
10

of the jury, whether there is any objection the admission of evidence which the trial court has
already ruled admissible over counsel's pretrial objection, is not a plain abandonment of the
objection akin to the stipulation in Davidson; it is merely a recognition of the district court's
prior order. Indeed, there is nothing else counsel could say, other than to needlessly re-argue the
motion in limine in front of the jury-which is precisely what Davidson sought to avoid.
Defense counsel did not waive Ms. Martinez's objection to the untimely Rule 404(b)
notice by failing to object a second time during the trial. Where the district court had already
made an unqualified (albeit incorrect) pretrial ruling, any requirement that Ms. Martinez make a
second objection in front of the jury would be inconsistent with a long line of Idaho Supreme
Court cases adopting the Davidson standard.

B.

Evidence Raising The Inference That Ms. Martinez Was Driving Drunk Or High Is BadAct Evidence Within The Meaning Of Rule 404(b)
As an alternative to its proposed procedural bars, the State also argues that the district

court correctly determined that the evidence described in the State's own Rule 404(b) notice was
not actually subject to Rule 404(b). (Resp. Br., pp.18-21.) While the State acknowledges jurors
could "think that Martinez' demeanor in the videos was indicative of drug use or intoxication," it
seeks to dismiss, or at least diminish, this possibility on two grounds: ( 1) the prosecutor
ultimately chose not to argue that theory to the jury; and (2) jurors drawing such an inference
would have to "play expert," which the State seems to imply is impermissible, or at least
improbable. (Resp. Br., p.20.) Neither contention has merit.
The State's primary argument appears to be that the jury could not have inferred from the
videos that Ms. Martinez was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, because the prosecutor
ultimately chose not to argue that theory to the jury. (See Resp. Br., pp.18-21.) However, the
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prosecutor does not dictate how evidence is construed and weighed by jurors5; the jurors are
permitted to draw whatever inferences they choose, so long as they are reasonable. See, e.g.,
State v. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898 (2000) ("The jury is accorded the right to determine the

credibility of witnesses, to weigh the evidence, and to draw all reasonable and justifiable
inferences."). Here, an objectively reasonable conclusion for jurors viewing Exhibits 1 and 2
was that Ms. Martinez was drunk or high. Indeed, both the prosecutor and district judge thought
so. While the prosecutor later abandoned the theory, when he initially filed his Rule 404(b)
notice, he argued the videos would be used to show Ms. Martinez was high on
methamphetamine:
If the jury were to conclude from the evidence of Defendant's
behavior ... that Defendant uses methamphetamine, then that would be relevant
to showing Defendant knew of the substance in her vehicle and knew that it was a
controlled substance. Furthermore, it is relevant to establishing the intent element
for the Drug Paraphernalia charge. See State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 590, 6 P.3d
840 (Ct. App. 2000) (prior methamphetamine use was relevant to the intent
element of a possession of drug paraphernalia charge).

(Aug., p.3.) Even when he changed tactics the following day, he still acknowledged the jurors
could view the body camera videos "and say: Oh, she's totally a meth user.

She's guilty."

(Tr., p.29, L.24-p.30, L.11; accord Tr., p.33, Ls.15-18.)
Likewise, the district court concluded that body camera videos depicting Ms. Martinez's
strange behavior could be considered as evidence of her drug use:
Well, that's part of the stop, part of the situation the officers were faced with, part
of legitimate evidence in trial, especially as it appears defendant is claiming that
she did not know drugs were in the car. They were not her drugs, that that's the
5

(See Tr., p.132, L.23 - p.24, L.8 (instructing the jurors that the arguments of counsel are not
evidence), p.134, Ls.1-3 (instructing the jurors that their duty is to fmd the facts), p.136, Ls.1-6
("You are to consider all the evidence . . . . However, the law does not require you to believe all
of the evidence. As the sole judges of facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and
what weight you attach to it."), p.409, Ls.11-19 (again instructing the jurors that the arguments
of counsel are not evidence), p.416, Ls.10-19 (again instructing the jurors that they are the sole
fact-fmders).)
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defense. I think that evidence is relevant on that. Plus, it's just part of the whole
facts of the stop and what led to the drug dog being brought in and discovery of
the other evidence anyway. So I think it's essential and has real probative value.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.3-13.) The fact that the State itself, as well as the district court, believed the videos
could raise the inference that Ms. Martinez was under the influence is a powerful indicator that
such an inference by jurors would have been objectively reasonable.
The State also argues that, in order for jurors to have inferred Ms. Martinez was under the
influence, they would have had to have "play[ed] expert." (Resp. Br., p.20.) Not so. No
specialized knowledge is necessary for a layman to infer that someone is under the influence.
See State v. Thomas, 79 Idaho 372, 377 (1957) ("It is well recognized that opinion evidence as to

intoxication is admissible as nonexpert opinion evidence .... 'Recognition of the fact that a
person is in a drunken or intoxicated condition requires no peculiar scientific knowledge."')
(quoting 20 Am. Jur., Evidence§ 876). In fact, jurors are routinely called upon-typically at the
request of the prosecution-to infer that someone was under the influence of drugs and/or
alcohol based solely on that person's appearance and behavior at the time. See, e.g., State v.
Bronnenberg, 124 Idaho 67, 70 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding sufficient evidence to sustain a DUI

conviction under the impairment theory where the defendant "could not remember the alphabet
when asked, ... she either could not recall or else was unable to follow the officer's simple
instructions to walk and count at the same time, and ... she was unable to keep her balance").
In this case, the body camera videos (Exhibits 1 and 2) show that during the traffic stop,
Ms. Martinez was fidgety, inarticulate, and unfocused; she appeared scattered in her thoughts;
her speech sounded odd and her mouth movements appeared exaggerated; and she gesticulated
excessively with an unlit cigarette. (See Ex. 1 at 0:31 - 0:46; Ex. 2 at 0:00 - 2:19.) This
evidence certainly raised an inference of drug or alcohol use, which clearly fell within the scope
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of Rule 404(b). (See App. Br., pp.9-12.) Accordingly, the district court erred in ruling that Rule
404(b) had no application in this case.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above and in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Martinez respectfully
requests that this Court vacate her convictions in the first case, reverse the district court's order
permitting the State to offer evidence suggesting Ms. Martinez was under the influence of drugs
or alcohol during her traffic stop, and remand her case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 21 st day of October, 2020.

/ s/ Erik R. Lehtinen
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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